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Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: 
Their Impact on Settlement Incentives 
Bradley L. Smith 
Mounting criticism of American litigiousness has drawn greater 
attention to the two prevailing rules concerning attorney fees and liti-
gation.1 The familiar American rule requires that each party bear its 
own fees,2 while the British rule requires the losing party to pay the 
winner's attorney fees. 3 The American rule has been attacked on 
grounds of inefficiency and unfairness. Opponents claim the rule pro-
motes wasteful litigation expenditures, implausible claims, strike suits, 
onerous discovery demands, and spurious defenses.4 Moreover, the 
1. Nearly 18 million civil lawsuits were filed in state and federal courts in 1989. PRES!· 
DENT'S CoUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JusncE REFORM IN AMERICA 1 
(1991) [hereinafter COUNCIL ON CoMPETITIVENESS]. Federal District Court filings have nearly 
tripled since 1960. Id. It is estimated that U.S. businesses and governments spent over $117 
billion on direct litigation costs and higher insurance premiums in 1987; 1991 expenditures may 
have reached $184 billion. Leslie Spencer, The Tort Tax, FORBES, Feb. 17, 1992, 40 at 40. Indi· 
rect costs, including measures to avoid litigation, increase the total to over $300 billion annually. 
Id. at 42. Prominent critics of American litigiousness abound. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990); 
JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE Lmmous SOCIETY (1981); Derek c. Bok, A Flawed System, 
HARV. MAG., May-June 1983, at 38. Walter K. Olson is among the most forceful critics of the 
U.S. legal system. See WALTER K. OLSON, THE LmGATION EXPLOSION (1991). Reviewing his 
book, former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote: 
To demonstrate that our society is drowning in litigation, one only has to look at the over· 
worked system of justice, the delays in trials, the clogs businessmen face in commerce and a 
medical profession rendered overcautious for fear of malpractice suits. The litigation explo-
sion, which developed in barely more than a decade beginning in the 1970s, has affected us 
at all levels, including, as Mr. Olson notes, "the most sensitive and profound relationships of 
human life." The consequences of the explosion have become painfully obvious. Suits 
against hospitals and doctors, which went up 300-fold since the 1970s, increased doctors' 
medical insurance premiums more than 30-fold for some. We have more lawyers per 
100,000 people than any other society in the world. We have almost three times as many 
lawyers per capita as Britain, with whom we share the common law system. 
Warren E. Burger, Too Many Lawyers, Too Many Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1991, § 7 (Book 
Review), at 12. 
2. The American rule has long dominated the legal landscape in this country. The U.S. 
Supreme Court first articulated it in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its prevalence, most recently in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. 
Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240 (1975). For an overview of fee shifting and the American 
rule, see generally Symposium, Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Winter 1984, 
at 1. 
3. Some have called it the "rest-of-the-world rule,'' as virtually every other legal system rou· 
tinely awards fees to the prevailing party. See OLSON, supra note 1, at 329-30. 
4. Noneconomic articles advocating adoption of the British Rule include Philip S. Figa, The 
"American Rule" Has Outlived its Usefulness,· Adopt the ''English Rule," NATL. L.J., Oct. 20, 
1986, at 13; Michael F. Maver & Wayne Stix, The Prevailing Party Should Recover Counsel Fees, 
8 AKRON L. REv. 426 (1975); Phillip A. Middleton, To the Victor. the Spoils: Proposal to Aban· 
don the American Rule, 41 Mo. BAR J. 79 (1985); Mathew B. Wills & Neil Gold, Attorneys' Fees 
in Litigation: Time to Discard the American Rule?, LITIG., Spring 1978, at 31. 
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American rule violates the equitable principle that a party who suffers 
injury should be made whole. 5 Supporters of the American rule 
counter that a "loser pays" rule deters risk-averse plaintiffs from pur-
suing meritorious claims, especially against rich defendants who can 
afford expensive counsel. 6 
A substantial body of literature has emerged analyzing the theoret-
ical impact of the two rules on a litigant's decision to file a claim and 
settle or proceed to trial. 7 Law-and-economics scholars such as Rich-
ard Posner and Steven Shaven concluded that switching to the British 
rule would lead to the counterintuitive result of lower settlement 
rates. 8 Others predicted more expensive trials under a loser-pays 
rule.9 More recently, John Hause demonstrated that switching from 
the American to the British rule would probably lead to fewer claims 
and more settlements, in large part because tried cases would tend to 
cost more. 10 The large body of literature analyzing fee shifting, how-
ever, does not explicitly consider the widely used contingency fee and 
its relationship to litigants' decision processes.11 
5. For a particularly moving argument based on personal experience, see Albert A. 
Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REv. 792 (1966) 
(recounting from personal experience the impossibility of retaining counsel under the American 
rule for modest household moving losses and advocating adoption of the British rule). 
6. For example, Ralph Nader denounced a Bush administration proposal to move partially 
toward the British rule, saying "corporate goliaths" would use the rule to "intimidate victims." 
Public Citizen press release (Aug. 13, 1991), quoted in Daily Rep. For Executives (BNA), Aug. 
14, 1991, at A3. 
7. John Gould, William Landes, Richard Posner, and Steven Shaven were important contrib-
utors to development of a decision model based on the litigants' subjective assessments of 
probability of success, magnitude of judgment, and estimate of legal costs. See John P. Gould, 
The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); William M. Landes, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); Steven 
Shaven, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the 
Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982). For a good summary of the law-and-
economics literature addressing this issue, see Richard D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1067 (1989). 
Other helpful articles include John J. Donohue Ill, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and 
Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1093 (1991); l.P.L. 
P'ng, Stategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. EcoN. 539 (1983); Edward A. 
Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts 
Theory, 6 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 345 (1990). 
8. Richard A. Posner, Comment on Donohue, 22 LAW & SocY. REv. 927, 928 (1988) 
("[M]aking the losing party pay the winning party's attorney's fees would reduce, not increase, 
the settlement rate."); Shaven, supra note 7, at 65 Qower settlement rates under British rule when 
parties' expected judgments are equal). In his well-known law-and-economics book, Judge Pos-
ner is more guarded, predicting uncertain settlement effects but higher direct litigation costs. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 539-40 (3d ed. 1986). 
9. See Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 
47 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1984); John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, 
or I'll Be Suing You, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 157 (1989); Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for 
Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 143 (1987). 
10. Hause, supra, note 9, at 167-68. 
11. The common practice of paying one's attorney a fixed percentage of any recovery is an-
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In a controversial report recommending measures to restrain liti-
gation, the President's Council on Competitiveness (PCC) has advo-
cated adoption of a modified British rule which would award attorney 
fees to the prevailing party. 12 The PCC proposal limits indemnifica-
tion of the winner's attorney fees to the loser's own legal costs, thus 
mitigating the concern that a wealthy litigant could extort submission 
from an opponent by threatening to conduct a very costly legal cam-
paign.13 The rule would allow judicial discretion to limit indemnifica-
tion further where appropriate.14 Application of the PCC rule would 
be limited to lawsuits based on diversity jurisdiction in federal court. 15 
other anomaly of the American legal system. P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some 
Anglo-American Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1017. 
12. CoUNCIL ON CoMPETITIVENESS, supra note 1, at 24-25. The report was the basis for 
Vice President Quayle's much-publicized address to the American Bar Association in Atlanta in 
August, 1991. 
Legislation has been introduced in Congress to implement the Council's recommendations. 
The relevant provisions of the House and Senate bills are identical: 
SEC. 3. DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION; AWARD OF ATIORNEYS' 
FEES TO PREVAILING PARTY. 
Section 1332 or title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting after subsection (e) 
the following new subsection: 
"(f)(l) The prevailing party in an action under this section shall be entitled to attorneys' 
fees only to the extent that such party prevails on any position or claim advanced during the 
action. Attorneys' fees under this paragraph shall be paid by the nonprevailing party but 
shall not exceed the amount of the attorneys' fees of the nonprevailing party with regard to 
such position or claim. If the nonprevailing party receives services under a contingent fee 
agreement, the amount of attorneys' fees under this paragraph shall not exceed the reason-
able value of those services. 
"(2) In order to receive attorneys' fees under paragraph (1), counsel of record in any 
action under this section shall maintain accurate, complete records of hours worked on the 
matter regardless of the fee arrangement with his or her client. 
"(3) As used in this subsection, the term 'prevailing party' means a party to an action 
who obtains a favorable final judgment (other than by settlement), exclusive of interest, on 
all or a portion of the claims asserted during the action. 
"(4) The court may, in its discretion, limit the fees recovered under paragraph (1) to the 
extent that the court finds special circumstances that make payment of such fees unjust. 
"(5) This subsection shall not apply to any action removed from a State court pursuant 
to section 1441 of this title, or to any action in which the United States, any State, or any 
agency, officer, or employee of the United States or any State is a party •••• ["] 
H.R. 4155, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 138 CoNG. REC. H259, H260 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
1992); S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 138 CoNG. REc. S910, S911 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
1992). 
13. This clearly undesirable predicament is apparently not a significant problem under the 
pure British rule as commonly practiced. After final judgment, the parties appear before a 
taxmaster attached to the court whose decision is seldom appealed. The taxmaster often limits 
indemnification after considering the characteristics of the controversy and parties involved, es-
pecially if the prevailing party demands unreasonable legal fees. Aliyah, supra note 11, at 1023; 
Maver & Stix, supra note 4, at 430-31. See generally Symposium, supra note 2. In Ontario, 
Canada, such considerations frequently result in the prevailing party's recovering only one half 
of legal expenses. Interview with Ronald Walker, Practicing Toronto Attorney, in Ann Arbor, 
Mich. (April 12, 1992). 
14. CoUNCIL ON CoMPETITIVENESS, supra note 1, at 24. 
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). The rule would not affect federal subject matter jurisdiction 
suits, such as civil rights and environmental protection statutes. The diversity plaintiff would be 
free to avoid the fee-shifting rule by pursuing his claim in state court. The PCC may have 
restricted application of its proposed rule as a political compromise necessary for passage; the 
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This Note seeks to predict the direction and magnitude of the 
change in settlement frequency under the three fee-shifting rules: 
American, British, and the British rule as modified by the PCC. Part I 
analyzes the proposed rule using the theoretical model of litigation 
and settlement developed by Hause. Part II examines the impact of 
fee shifting when the plaintiff's lawyer receives reimbursement via a 
contingency fee. Analysis of indemnification in a contingency fee con-
text raises several policy issues which section II.A addresses. Section 
II.B discusses the terms and assumptions made in adjusting Hause's 
model to reflect the standard contingency fee arrangement, and section 
II.C proceeds with an economic analysis to discern the impact of the 
three rules on settlement. This Note concludes that regardless of how 
the plaintiff's lawyer is compensated, a modified British rule will prob-
ably result in more settlements than the American rule and will mod-
erate the likelihood of greatly increased trial expenses sometimes 
predicted under a pure British rule. 
I. THE BASIC SETTLEMENT MODEL 
This Part examines the likelihood of settlement under the Ameri-
can, British, and PCC rules. The traditional model of litigation and 
settlement behavior is first reviewed and adjusted to reflect the pro-
posed PCC rule. After comparing the likelihood of settlement under 
the three fee-shifting rules, the analysis is repeated incorporating 
Hause's important modifications into the litigant decision model. This 
Part concludes with a discussion of the implications of adopting a 
modified British rule absent contingency fee considerations. 
The prevailing economic model of the claim, settlement, and litiga-
tion decision assumes that a plaintiff will file a claim when profitable 
and that parties will settle when such compromise is in their mutual 
best interests. Let P be the plaintiff's subjective probability that the 
plaintiff will prevail if his suit proceeds to trial, 16 C be the plaintiff's 
direct legal costs of going to trial, 17 and J be the judgment he expects 
to receive if he prevails. The plaintiff's expected benefit F of pursuing 
his case to trial under the American rule is 
FA= PJ- c. (1) 
Let the defendant's expected probability that the plaintiff will prevail 
proposal's limited reach mitigates the worst fears of skeptics in the American Bar Association 
and Congress. 
16. To facilitate exposition, the hypothetical plaintiff will assume the masculine pronoun and 
his variables will be uppercase. The defendant will assume the feminine pronoun with lowercase 
variables. 
17. The economic analysis ignores the indirect costs of trial, e.g., pyschic costs, opportunity 
costs due to time spent away from normal activities, and bad publicity. These costs, often sub-
stantial, are obviously difficult to quantify. Affected litigants will seek settlement sooner than the 
economic model suggests. 
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be p, her expected judgment amount if plaintiff prevails be j, and her 
own estimated costs of trial be c. Under the American rule, the de-
fendant's expected cost, f, is 
fA = pj + c. (2) 
Under a "pure" British rule, the successful plaintiff expects to re-
cover not only a judgment, J, but also his legal costs. His expected 
gain, however, is tempered by the probability that he will lose (1 - P) 
times the defendant's legal costs incurred via indemnification: 
FB = P(J + C) - (1 - P)c - C. (3) 
Similarly, the defendant's expected costs under the British rule are 
fB = p(j + C) - (1 - p)c + c. (4) 
Finally, the PCC rule modifies the respective expectations held by 
the plaintiff and defendant under the British Rule. The prevailing 
party receives indemnification only to the extent of the loser's own 
legal costs. Thus, the successful plaintiff will recover either C or c, 
whichever is less, and if unsuccessful will pay out the lesser of C or c : 
FM = P(J + min(C:c)) - (1 - P)(min(C:c)) - C. (5) 
Analogous limits apply to the defendant's expected costs, f: 
JM= p(j + min(C:c)) - (1 - p) (min(C:c)) + c. (6) 
If the plaintiff's expected gain from going to trial, F, is less than 
(or equal to) the defendant's expected costs of going to trial, f, settle-
ment is in both parties' interests. In such a case, avoiding legal costs 
maximizes expected wealth. 18 The condition for settlement under the 
American rule is thus 
or alternatively, 
PJ- C :5..pj + c 
PJ- pj :5..C + c 
or 
0 :5..pj - PJ + C + c. 
(7) 
Equation (7) states that settlement will occur if the difference in judg-
ments expected by the plaintiff and the defendant is less than the com-
bined anticipated costs of going to trial. 19 
18. When F = $300 and f = $500, the settlement range lies between these figures. Both 
parties benefit by settling out of court for $400. If F > f no settlement will occur. This section 
of the Note assumes that both parties are rational economic wealth maximizers and are not risk-
averse. This standard assumption, although admittedly unrealistic, is informally relaxed when 
the relationship between the applicable rule and the parties' assessment of plaintiff's success is 
discussed. See infra text accompanying note 24. 
19. Legal costs of settlement are transaction costs that will also affect the settlement equn-
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The settlement conditions for the other rules are rearranged simi-
larly. Under the British rule: 
0 ;S;.pj - PJ - (P - p)(C + c) + C + c (8) 
and PCC rule: 
0 ;S;.pj - PJ - (P - p)(2min(C:c)) + C + c. (9) 
A comparison of equations (7) and (8) reveals that the settlement 
condition under the British rule will be satisfied less often than the 
condition under the American rule so long as the parties are optimis-
tic, i.e., when P > p,20 and the variables remain independent of the 
fee-shifting rule, i.e., PA= PB, CA= CB, etc. The right hand side (RHS) 
of equation (8) will always be less than the RHS of (7) given these 
assumptions. Thus under the British rule, the range of mutually ac-
ceptable settlement values decreases. This occurs because the stakes 
under indemnification are higher than under the American rule - the 
winner is better off and the loser is worse off. This result led Posner 
and Shaven to conclude that the British rule would lead to fewer 
settlements. 21 
Settlement under the PCC rule (9) is readily compared to the Brit-
ish rule (8). Clearly, the RHS of equation (9) will always equal or 
exceed that of equation (8), indicating more settlements under the 
PCC rule. The middle term under the British rule condition will al-
ways be more negative (because P - p is positive by assumption) than 
the middle term of the PCC condition so long as C-:j:.c. Because the 
settlement condition is harder to satisfy under the British rule, fewer 
settlements should occur under that rule than the PCC rule. 
Hause's most important contribution to the above analysis shows 
that two assumptions implicit in it are seriously flawed. First, because 
the stakes are higher under the British and PCC rules, litigants will 
tend to spend more heavily on legal services to increase their 
probability of winning. Legal expenditures are effectively discounted 
by a party's assessment of personal success. Under the British rule, a 
plaintiff ninety percent convinced of prevailing at trial who spends one 
dollar on legal work expects to recover ninety cents of that dollar. 
Given increased stakes and discounted legal costs, parties will natu-
tion. Settlement costs will remain constant, however, regardless of the fee-shifting rule adopted. 
They are ignored in the text because they fall out upon comparison of the different fee-shifting 
rules. Hause, supra note 9, at 166-67. 
20. Optimistic in this context means the plaintiff places a higher probability on his success 
and the defendant places a lower probability on plaintiff's success. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 
524. Thus, the parties are optimistic if the plaintiff thinks he has a 30% chance of winning and 
the defendant thinks the plaintiff's odds are only 20%. If the parties are pessimistic, i.e., P < p, 
the settlement condition will virtually always be satisfied when J andj are approximately equal. 
21. See supra note 8. 
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rally spend more to influence the outcome.22 A proof of this proposi-
tion may be found in the appendix. The PCC rule also increases the 
stakes of litigation, but more modestly than the British rule due to 
indemnification limits. It follows that the parties' legal costs under the 
PCC rule will also tend to be greater than under the American rule 
but less than those under the pure British rule. 
The second flawed assumption is that the parties' expectations of 
success, P and p, remain constant under differing legal rules. As the 
stakes change, the parties very likely will become more concerned 
about precise predictions of success.23 The costs of false optimism are 
higher under an indemnity system. Moreover, indemnity will invaria-
bly intimidate some risk-averse parties.24 These litigants will tend to 
be more conservative in their estimates of the likelihood of success to 
compensate for greater exposure to fee liability. Both of these effects 
will bring the parties' estimates of P and p closer together under both 
the British and PCC rules - the "probability gap" will converge. 
To analyze correctly the effect of the fee-shifting rule on settle-
ment, these increased legal costs and converging probabilities must be 
considered explicitly. Returning to the equations defining the settle-
ment conditions, implicitly assume that the expected judgment 
amount J equalsj25 and assume further that J andj are independent of 
the fee-shifting rule. 26 The settlement conditions become: 
P ,J - p,J ~ CA + cA (American) 
Pol - PBi ~ (1 + PB - PB) (CB + cB) (British) 
P~ - PMi ~ (pM - PM) (2min(C~cM)) + (CM + CM)· (PCC) 
22. Numerous commentators have reached this conclusion. The appendix reproduces the 
methodology used by Hause. See supra note 9, at 165-66. For wholly different theoretical ap-
proaches that reach the same conclusion, see Braeutigam et al., supra note 9; Katz, supra note 9. 
23. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 539; Katz, supra note 9, at 158. 
24. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 8, at 539. 
25. The nomenclature differentiating the two parties' expectations is retained to illustrate the 
behavior of the settlement model. Commentators nearly always assume J = j. See, e.g., Sha veil, 
supra note 7, at 65. This simplifying assumption is most likely true in straightforward contract 
disputes; it may be less true in specific claims involving highly variable nonmonetary injuries. In 
any event, it is likely true in the aggregate of civil suits. 
26. In economic terms, we are assuming J and j are exogenous, i.e., the magnitude of the 
judgment is not affected by changes in other terms in the equation. Hause claims that this as-
sumption does not alter the analysis. Hause, supra note 9, at 168 & n.13. A more objectionable 
assumption implicit in the following analysis is that c is unaffected by changes in C. One would 
expect that a large increase in plaintiff's legal costs would prompt some response from defend-
ant's counsel. Hersch pursues this analysis and concludes that, although codependence of the 
parties' legal costs probably softens Hause's predictions, Hause's conclusions remain valid. Phil-
lip L. Hersch, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation: Comment and Extension, 19 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 235, 240 & n.11 (1990). 
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Rearrangement of the equations facilitates comparison: 
0 .$. (p.J - PAJ) + (CA + CA) (10) 
0 .$. (pBj - PBJ) (PB - PB)(CB + CB) + (CB + CB) (11) 
0 .$. (pAf.i - PJ) - (PM - PM)(2min(C~cM)) + (CM + cM)· (12) 
The greater the magnitude of the RHS of the equations, the more 
easily the settlement condition is satisfied. As stated above and proven 
in the appendix, litigation costs will generally be higher under the Brit-
ish rule, i.e., C»cB > CA>cA. The magnitude of the increase is unclear, 
although both Hause and Katz have predicted the British rule could 
easily double the cost of litigation.27 Thus the last term of the RHS 
under the American rule will be substantially smaller than the corre-
sponding term under the British rule. Higher predictions of legal ex-
penses under the British rule will clearly encourage the parties to 
avoid these costs through settlement. 
Higher stakes under the PCC rule will also drive up litigation 
costs, CM; however, stakes and costs will always be highest under the 
British rule. The term (CB + cB) will be largest, followed by (CM+ 
cM) and (CA + cA)· Thus legal costs should promote settlement most 
often under the British rule, followed by the PCC rule and the Ameri-
can rule. 
Next, consider the first term of the American rule and the corre-
sponding terms below. This term represents the difference between 
the parties' expectations of trial outcome. Although facially identical 
under the three rules, the term is greatly affected by converging 
probability estimates discussed above. 28 The difference between the 
parties' estimates of the plaintiff's success (p - P) will shrink under 
indemnification as the litigants become more concerned with accuracy 
and, if risk-averse, less optimistic. The first term will accordingly be 
largest and least favorable to settlements under the American rule, and 
smallest and most favorable under the British rule. The PCC propo-
sal, with less than full indemnity and medial stakes, will again occupy 
an intermediate position. 
Both terms just examined would thus predict higher rates of settle-
ment under the British and PCC rules than the American rule. The 
pivotal term is (PB - PB)(CB + cB) in the British rule (11), and the 
parallel PCC term in (12). These terms, absent from the American 
rule, will be negative and will detract from the probability of settle-
ment. The probability contraction discussed above directly affects this 
term. Although PB >PB by assumption, it would probably be uncom-
27. Hause, supra note 9, at 175 ("[H]igh levels of indemnity may induce excessive trial ex-
penditures."); Katz, supra note 9, at 171 ("[The] English rule could result in an increase in 
[litigation] expenditure of over 100 percent in the typical case."). 
28. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
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mon for PB - PB to be "large" (relative to 1) due to the tendency of 
parties' estimates to converge as the stakes increase.29 Hause finds it 
"intuitively plausible" that this middle term will not usually be so 
powerful as to overcome the effects of the British rule on the first and 
last terms. 30 He thus concludes that the British rule will result in 
more settlement than the American rule. If his conclusion is correct, 
then the PCC rule will also result in more settlement than the Ameri-
can rule. The indemnifying limitation under the PCC rule sharply re-
stricts the magnitude of this term; it will normally be substantially less 
negative than under the British rule and consequently have less of a 
dampening effect on settlement. 
By effectively discounting expected legal costs of trial, the British 
and PCC rules introduce a new term into their settlement conditions 
that discourages settlement. However, increased legal costs and con-
verging probability estimates almost certainly affect settlement condi-
tions under indemnification rules. Higher legal costs under 
indemnification will induce many optimistic litigants to avoid these 
costs by settling. Allowing indemnification will also tend to narrow 
the probability gap between the parties' predictions of the plaintiff's 
success and thus further encourage settlement. The above analysis 
predicts a net increase in settlement under both the British and PCC 
rules when compared to settlement under the American rule. How-
ever, because the PCC rule limits indemnification, settlement rates will 
not be as high as they would be under a pure loser-pays rule. 
II. FEE SHIFTING IN A CONTINGENCY FEE CONTEXT 
The contingency fee dominates most tort litigation in the United 
States today.31 Under a contingency-fee arrangement, the attorney 
contracts with the plaintiff for a portion, typically one third, of the 
amount collected from a trial judgment or through settlement. Some-
times the plaintiff's attorney will be rewarded far in excess of the time 
and effort invested in the case, while at other times he will receive 
nothing. Over time and many cases, an attorney will presumably 
achieve a market rate of return in such contingency cases. 32 
Proponents claim the contingency-fee arrangement offers three im-
29. Hause, supra note 9, at 167; see also Hersch, supra note 26, at 235. But see John J. 
Donohue, The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observations on Costs, 
Conflicts, and Contingency Fees, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 195, 203-06 (argu-
ing that, if total litigation cost-to-damages ratio remains constant under the changing rules, P8 -
Po must be fairly large). 
30. Hause, supra note 9, at 167. 
31. The Federal Trade Commision reports that 97% of lawyers accept personal injury cases 
only on a contingency basis. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Contingency Fees and the Common Good, 
WALL ST. J., July 21, 1989, at Al4. 
32. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Contingent Fees For Lawyers: The Impact on 
Litigation and Accident Prevention, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 381, 384-85 (1991). 
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portant advantages. 33 First, it enables plaintiffs who might not be able 
to afford an hourly rate attorney the opportunity to pursue a claim on 
an attorney's "borrowed time." Second, because the outcome of a 
lawsuit is inherently uncertain, plaintiffs are able to shift their eco-
nomic risk to the attorney who can spread the risk over his entire 
caseload. Finally, the contingent fee aligns the interests of the princi-
pal/plaintiff with those of the agent/attorney. Critics of the contin-
gent fee system counter that it produces high fees, encourages 
excessive litigation, 34 and creates incentives for lawyers to accept set-
tlement offers when it is contrary to their clients' best interests. 35 
The nature of a fee-shifting rule in a contingency-fee context 
largely depends on 'the resolution of three questions: Should the plain-
tiff or his attorney indemnify the winning defendant her attorney's 
fees; how should the contingency-fee lawyer's costs be assessed; and 
from whose perspective, plaintiff's or his attorney's, should the likeli-
hood of settlement be determined? These questions raise important 
policy concerns that provide insight into the theoretical economic 
analysis. This Part begins by discussing these policy issues with mini-
mal economic analysis; it proposes a set of rules that allocates the 
costs, risks, and benefits between the legal actors. Section II.B uses 
the economic tools developed in Part I to construct the parties' ex-
pected benefit and cost equations under the American, British, and 
PCC rules. Using these results, section II.C analyzes four different 
sets of settlement equations under the different fee-shifting rules, rep-
resenting the four most likely conditions under which indemnification 
would operate. 
33. See id. at 381; Terry Thomason, Are Attorneys Paid What They're Worth? Contingent 
Fees and the Settlement Process, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 187, 187-88 (1991). 
34. The contingency fee allegedly acts as a de facto "sales commission" in the recruitment 
and representation of plaintiffs. For example, firms specializing in representing tort plaintiffs 
commonly spend large amounts in television advertising. Lawyers spent over $102 million in 
television advertising in 1991. Telephone Interview with Ronni Faust, Television Bureau of Ad-
vertising (Mar. 23, 1992) (data supplied by Arbitron Media Watch Service of top 75 markets); 
Charlotte Ahern, Legal Eagles Make a Case for TV Advertising Boon, ADVERTISING AGE 110 
(Oct. 19, 1987) (reporting $47 million in lawyer advertising on television in 1986). Contingency-
fee plaintiffs by definition have nothing to lose other than indirect burdens such as psychic costs. 
Cf. supra note 17. Heavy solication, which typically emphasizes the absence of monetary risk to 
the client, certainly encourages individuals to seek legal redress. Even nonmeritorious suits will 
settle given sufficiently high defense estimates of direct legal fees and indirect costs of trial. Id. 
Miceli and Segerson acknowledge that, if an accident has occurred, the contingent fee system 
encourages more suits to be filed than an hourly fee system. Nevertheless, they argue that the 
deterrent effect of such lawsuits may elicit greater care by potential injurers and thus reduce the 
overall number of lawsuits. Miceli & Segerson, supra note 32, at 388-91. 
35. For an economic analysis of the divergent interests, see equations (16) and (17) infra and 
accompanying text. See also sources cited infra note 47. For an unrestrained critique of the 
influence of the attorney-agent in settlement and trial, supported by innumerable anecdotes, see 
OLSON, supra note 1, at 51-66 (ch. 3: "Role Reversal: How Lawyers Took Charge"). 
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A. Policy Questions 
This section examines three issues that immediately arise when fee-
shifting is implemented in a contingency fee legal environment. The 
first is whether the losing plaintiff or his attorney should bear legal 
responsibility to pay the winner's attorney fees. Second, there are sev-
eral possible definitions of plaintiff's legal costs. Fee shifting requires 
a determination of which definition should be used under varying cir-
cumstances. Finally, Part I compared settlement conditions from the 
perspective of the underlying parties. Under a contingency fee ar-
rangement, however, the plaintiff's lawyer has incentives to settle that 
usually diverge from the client's interests. 36 The choice of whose per-
spective to adopt, the plaintiff's or his attorney's, has a large impact 
when comparing the likelihood of settlement under different fee-shift-
ing rules. 
The discussion below assumes (1) that a constant percentage, {3, of 
the plaintiff's proceeds flow to the contingency-fee attorney,37 and (2) 
that this percentage applies only to the amount received in judgment 
or settlement; the contingency-fee attorney would not receive one 
third of any attorney fee received from the indemnifying party. 
Mathematically, 
compensation = f3J not {3(J + attorney fees). 
A rule allowing enhanced attorney fee recovery, {3 times the sum of 
judgment plus fees, has little merit. If attorneys require higher com-
pensation to cover increased risks arising under a fee-shifting rule, 
they may adjust {3 to remain viable and competitive. Furthermore, 
one of the primary purposes of attorney fee indemnification is to en-
sure that the injured plaintiff receives full compensation.38 Taking one 
third of the total money changing hands will obviously dilute the 
plaintiff's final recovery.39 Finally, augmenting the prevailing attor-
ney's fees logically suggests increasing the indemnification provided by 
the defendant to keep the plaintiff whole. Once started, such a cycle 
continues ad infinitum. 
Preliminarily, the legal system must decide whether the plaintiff or 
his attorney should be responsible for indemnifying the prevailing de-
fendant. Several policy reasons exist for placing this risk on the plain-
36. The analysis assumes that the defendant will continue to pay her attorney on an hourly 
basis; thus, the question of proper perspective in Part II only involves the plaintiff. 
37. Typically, the contingency percentage is one third of all proceeds, although it reportedly 
reaches 50% in some cases. OLSON, supra note 1, at 47. The assumption of a constant percent· 
age reflects typical practice, although some attorneys vary the percentage depending on the stage 
of litigation, e.g., 30% of settlement proceeds and 50% of trial judgment proceeds. See Donohue, 
supra note 29, at 210 n.55. 
38. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 5. 
J. (J +fee) 
39. 3 1s always less than 
3 
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tiff's attorney. First, the attorney is usually better equipped to assess 
the risks and benefits of contemplated legal actions and can more eas-
ily pursue the information necessary to make an informed decision. In 
a typical case, the plaintiff has little knowledge of the law, likely de-
fense costs, or the likelihood of trial success. With these advantages 
over the client, the attorney is arguably better positioned both to make 
the decision and to bear the ensuing risk of loss. Second, experienced 
trial lawyers are probably less risk averse - more "rational" in eco-
nomic terms - than their clients. If so, claims that ought to be pur-
sued when considered from a purely objective economic viewpoint will 
less likely be abandoned due to an "irrational" fear of losing. Third, 
juries may be more objective in assessing the merits of cases when the 
attorney bears indemnification responsibility. If a jury knows that a 
verdict for the defendant will result in hardship for the plaintiff, the 
jury may hesitate to "punish" the plaintiff by imposing the defendant's 
legal fees on him. The jury might be less inclined to let sympathy 
dictate its findings if it knew the plaintiff's attorney, and not the plain-
tiff, would bear the cost of defeat.40 
Other arguments for charging the attorney with indemnification 
parallel the justifications for allowing contingency fee arrangements in 
the first place.41 Plaintiffs as a class are often of modest means; bear-
ing the risk of indemnification clearly will dissuade some deserving 
plaintiffs from pursuing meritorious claims. The attorney can absorb 
the added risk of indemnification by increasing fees, thus spreading the 
implicit cost over the attorney's many clients. The one-time plaintiff 
cannot diversify risk in this manner. 
Indemnification shouldered by the attorney, however, has several 
serious policy drawbacks arising from the fundamental agency rela-
tionship between the attorney and the client. The attorney's role is 
mainly to serve as counsel - to offer opinions and advice and then 
follow the directions of his client.42 Placing indemnification responsi-
bility on the agent further magnifies the attorney's role in a dispute 
which is supposedly a contest between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
This is troubling, both ideologically and practicably. 
As a philosophical matter, absolving the plaintiff-principal of re-
sponsibility for his decisions turns the agency relationship on its head: 
the agent becomes responsible for decisions ostensibly made by the 
principal. This seems manifestly unfair to the attorney-agent. The at-
torney's pretrial responsibility, at least as traditionally defined, is to 
40. Cf. Angel Gomez III & Carla S. Harwitt, Jury Empathy Aids Counsel in Company's 
Defense, NATL. L.J., May 20, 1991, at 56 (exploring jury empathy and advocacy). 
41. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35. 
42. "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation 
•.. and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer 
shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1984). 
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advise and take subsequent action at the direction of his client. The 
indemnifying attorney who reluctantly goes to trial pays a high price 
for following his client's orders. The punitive aspect of such risk allo-
cation is the equivalent of shooting the messenger who bears bad 
news.43 Furthermore, elevating the attorney's role in the proceedings 
necessarily diminishes the client's role and undermines respect for the 
plaintiff and his claim. Under the current system, the contingency-fee 
plaintiff bears no responsibility for any legal costs. Not coincidentally, 
plaintiffs and their grievances are commonly held in low esteem by 
defendants, the defense bar, and increasingly by the general public.44 
Sheltering plaintiffs from· responsibility for their decisions may also 
diminish respect for the legal system generally. 45 These effects subvert 
essential principles embodied in Western liberal traditions of respect 
for the individual and individual responsibility for one's decisions.46 
The most compelling reason to reject placing indemnification re-
sponsibility on the attorney is far more utilitarian. The contingency-
fee attorney already operates under the substantial risk that he will 
lose and not be paid for his work. This risk seriously misaligns the 
settlement incentives of the attorney and his client, leading to substan-
tially lower plaintiff recoveries. 47 An added attorney burden of indem-
nifi.cation would intensify the conflict and exacerbate its effect of 
eroding plaintiff recoveries. 
43. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA (As a messenger reports to 
Cleopatra the unwelcome news of her lover's marriage to Octavia): 
Messenger: "He's married, madam." 
Cleopatra: "Rogue, thou hast liv'd too long." (Draw a knife.) 
Messenger: "Nay then I'll run. What mean you madam? I have made no fault." (Exit.) 
Id. act 2, sc. 5. 
44. See Lance Morrow, A Nation of Fingerpointers, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 14 (cover story 
disparaging those who sue rather than recognizing their own responsibility). 
45. See, e.g., Atiyah, supra note 11, at 1002-03 (Professor of English Law at Oxford Univer-
sity criticizing American legal system). 
·46. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 53 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 1978) 
(London, Parker & Son 1859) ("[I]f [an individual] refrains from molesting others in what con-
cerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgement in things which 
concern himself, •.. he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into prac-
tice at his own cost."). 
47. The attorney has a personal incentive to settle the case early to avoid litigation costs and 
get paid his contingency percentage; the client may well expect to recover more if the case pro-
ceeds to trial. See equations (16) and (17) infra and accompanying text. This misalignment has 
attracted considerable attention in the law-and-economics literature. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987) (contingent fee 
attorneys will accept settlements that are suboptimal from the perspective of the claimant); An-
drew Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1976) 
(empirical evidence that class-action attorneys maximize their fees at the expense of plaintiff 
awards); Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent 
Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970) (contingent fee contracts create 
conflict of interest between attorneys and their clients); Thomason, supra note 33, at 221 (empiri-
cal evidence that worker compensation claimants who retain contingent-fee legal counsel may 
expect to receive smaller gross awards, before legal fees are deducted, than awards received by 
claimants who forgo legal advice). 
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On balance, placing the risk of defendant indemnification on the 
plaintiff better serves the plaintiff's interests. The contingency-fee at-
torney's superior ability to estimate probabilities accurately and to ab-
sorb risk is unfortunately far less useful to the plaintiff given the 
conflict of interest in settling created by a contingency fee system. The 
benefit of receiving a full, undiluted judgment if successful mitigates 
the potential cost that indemnification places on the plaintiff. The risk 
of indemnification will undoubtedly deter some plaintiffs from pursu-
ing borderline claims, but attorneys burdened with indemnification 
would reject many such claims anyway. Finally, some highly risk-
averse clients might fail to seek recovery for meritorious claims. In 
such cases, the contingency-fee attorney and plaintiff should be al-
lowed to negotiate an arrangement whereby the attorney agrees to in-
demnify if the defendant prevails.48 Thus, even highly risk-averse 
claimants may partially recover with competent counsel. 
The second question preliminary to the mathematical analysis re-
lates to the calculation of legal costs to be indemnified. In Part I, these 
costs were established by the actual costs billed by the parties' respec-
tive counsel. Under a contingency fee, there is no such billing of the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff's legal costs may be defined in one of three 
ways: (1) {3 (e.g., one third) times the amount of settlement or judg-
ment if successful at trial (denoted {3J); (2) a reasonable amount of 
compensation at fair market value based on the attorney's work 
(CJmv);49 or (3) the internal cost - the cost of spending time on the 
case as subjectively felt by the plaintiff's attorney (C;nr)· C;nr would 
normally be lower than C1mv because C1mv includes the attorney's profit 
markup.50 
Suppose a plaintiff prevails at trial and recovers a substantial judg-
ment. Which measure of cost should be charged to the defendant as 
proper indemnification? If the attorney has contracted with the plain-
48. This is simply an embodiment of the Coase theorem. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960) (parties will bargain around the operative legal rule to reach 
the identical, efficient outcome, provided there are no transaction costs and no wealth effects 
associated with the assignment of the legal entitlement). Law-and-economics scholars strongly 
defend the Coase theorem. For a collection of articles attacking a Coase critic, see Forum, A 
Response and a Reply to Whether Pigs Can Fly, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 1 (1991) (responding to 
Daniel Q. Posin, The Coase Theorem: If Pigs Could Fly, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 89 (1990)). Until 
recently, the Coase theorem was ignored in the fee-shifting literature. Donohue, supra note 7, 
1094. 
49. Ctm• would roughly correspond to the "lodestar" determination of appropriately shifted 
fees when a statute explicitly provides for such indemnification, i.e., reasonable hours times a 
reasonable rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (statutory fee-shifting case 
under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
(1988))). For a review of criticism directed at the lodestar method, see Charles Silver, Unloading 
the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 1'ExAs L. REv. 865 (1992) (proposing a 
new contract-based approach to simulate the free market). 
SO. This Note does not address the best method for ensuring precise determinations of C1m, 
and c,.,. Presumably these costs are self-reported by the plaintiff's attorney. See infra note 65 
for a discussion of monitoring these costs. 
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tiff to receive {3J, and the defendant pays the plaintiff's attorney less 
than {3J, the plaintiff must subtract the difference from his recovery to 
satisfy his contingency-fee contract.51 Paying the attorney C1n1 is easily 
rejected as too low; the defendant should at least indemnify C1mv· But 
should the defendant pay the full {3J? Such a requirement seems un-
fair if f3J is very large relative to C1mv· However, paying any less than 
f3J would deny the plaintiff full recovery. 
Federal courts have struggled with this definitional issue in cases 
where a contingency-fee plaintiff prevails under various federal stat-
utes which authorize fee shifting. 52 The Supreme Court recently re-
jected the occasional judicial practice of awarding attorney's fees 
greater than the fair market value of the prevailing attorney's serv-
ices. 53 However, the great majority of statutory fee-shifting cases ap-
pear to involve plaintiffs who prevail with only nominal damages or 
equitable relief or plaintiffs who have not contracted to pay their law-
yers a predetermined contingency percentage.54 In such cases, the de-
fendant, not the plaintiff, pays the above-market compensation. 
This Note assumes that when f3J exceeds C1mv the defendant will 
indemnify at the higher amount, with the important qualifier that f3 
must be reasonable as compared to similar cases tried under the Amer-
51. This section discusses the question in general terms; limited indemnification under the 
PCC rule highlights the issue in a more particular context. See infra section 11.B.3 (expected 
benefits and costs under the PCC rule). 
52. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1976, § 505, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988); Civil Rights Attorneys' 
Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 
§ 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1988). Note that all of these are one·way statutes. Compensating 
the winning attorney at a greater rate than Ctm• under such statutes, because (3J is higher, is 
termed "contingency enhanced" recovery. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' 
Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 720, 726 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
This Note does not address the impact of judicially imposed fee·shifting sanctions available 
under rule 11 (claims pursued in bad faith) or rule 68 (party rejecting settlement offer that was 
more favorable than eventual judgment pays opposing party's costs incurred after making the 
offer). FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 68. 
53. City of Burlington v. Dague, 60 U.S.L.W. 4717 (U.S. June 23, 1992) (No. 91-810). 
54. The situation where the plaintiff recovers only nominal damages is considered below. See 
supra text accompanying note 59. 
Neither City of Burlington nor its Supreme Court predecessor, Pennsylvania v. Delaware 
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987), involved enhanced attorney fee 
awards based on the plaintiff's obligation to pay his attorney a percentage of his recovery. See 
also, e.g., King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en bane 7-4 decision). Instead, these 
disputes centered on whether a court may enhance attorney fees beyond the fair market value of 
legal services to compensate for risk irrespective of any binding contingency arrangement with 
the client. At one point, the King opinion cites 17 circuit court cases addressing statutory recov-
ery of attorney's fees in excess of fair market value. 950 F.2d at 776. Only one of these 17 cited 
cases, Craig v. Secretary, Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 864 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1989), 
involved a request for enhanced legal fees based on the existence of a contingency percentage 
contract between the plaintiff and his lawyer. See 864 F.2d at 326. Contrary to the circum-
stances presented in most adjudicated disputes, this Part assumes that the plaintiff has contracted 
to pay his lawyer a predetermined contingency percentage. See supra text accompanying note 
37. 
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ican rule. ss This assumption seems sound for three reasons. s6 First, 
unlike the one-way federal fee-shifting statutes that have caused such 
judicial angst, the British and PCC rules are neutral in their applica-
tion. The potential for a higher recovery, f3J versus Cfm., thus seems 
more fair in light of the new indemnification risk borne by the plaintiff 
under these rules. 
Second, plaintiffs and attorneys are free to negotiate the contin-
gency percentage, {3J, for cases of a given class and region. If one 
assumes a competitive market among attorneys and effective bargain-
ing between plaintiffs and these attorneys, f3J represents fair compen-
sation based on perceived potential recovery and risk. Limiting 
attorney recovery to what is "reasonable" on a case-by-case basis is a 
purely post hoc judicial determination of the unknown risks and re-
wards that confronted the attorney at the outset of the case. s7 
Finally, limits on indemnification as prescribed by the PCC rule 
would essentially eliminate this thorny problem. When f3J is very 
large, the PCC rule will limit recovery to the defendant's legal costs, c; 
thus, the defendant will probably pay f3J unless indemnification is cir-
cumscribed by operation of the PCC rule. For all of these reasons, the 
economic model will assume the defendant indemnifies at the rate 
f3J.S8 
Now suppose that the plaintiff prevails at trial but recovers only 
nominal damages. 59 Should the defendant still be charged {3J? In this 
case the contingency fee arrangement clearly hurts the prevailing at-
torney. If the attorney had billed on an hourly basis, presumably the 
defendant would reimburse him fully. Because the scheme 
"overcharges" the defendant in the example above, "undercharging" 
her in this case on grounds of reciprocity is arguably fair. Considering 
the interests of the contingency-fee attorney in isolation, the reciproc-
ity argument is persuasive. Recovering a nominal amount is part of 
55. Without a reasonableness requirement, a plaintiff's attorney litigating under an indemni-
fication rule would have every incentive to set f3 at 90% or higher. 
56. These three reasons are hardly exhaustive; however, they seem persuasive in the context 
of this Note's comparative economic analysis. For a more thorough treatment of the issue, see 
sources cited supra note 53. 
57. Admittedly, the court must address the reasonableness of the contingency fee percentage, 
/3; however, this percentage is not set by perceived difficulty of the case but is usually fairly 
standardized by case type and by region. See OLSON, supra note l, at 47 ("going rate" seldom 
undercut even when success seems virtually assured). Determining f3 should present far less 
difficulty than a detailed examination of reasonable fees for an individual case. 
58. Pedagogical considerations are also implicated. Assuming a lesser recovery under the 
British rule would greatly impair comparison between that rule and the PCC rule in the settle-
ment equations in section 11.C. This comparison, one of the primary aims of this Note, is much 
easier to illustrate when consistency is maintained between the expectation equations under the 
different fee-shifting rules. 
59. "Nominal" damages would encompass declaratory judgments and inconsequential dam-
ages. As the term is used here, it would also include any award which compensates the plaintiff's 
lawyer less than the fair market value of his legal services. 
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the risk of accepting a contingency-fee case; the attorney is free to 
negotiate for the appropriate /3 to compensate for this possibility. 
However, one of the primary reasons given for establishing a fee-
shifting rule is to enable plaintiffs to recover when pursuing small but 
meritorious lawsuits. 60 The American rule and the contingency fee 
system combine to make such claims unattractive for both claimant 
and attorney. 61 Indeed, the legal system effectively denies legal redress 
to plaintiffs pursuing small damages and declaratory judgments be-
cause legal fees eclipse their claims. Although a fee-shifting rule 
would help plaintiffs who engage hourly-rate attorneys, contingency-
fee attorneys would reject similar cases if recovery were limited to f3J. 
Yet many risk-averse plaintiffs will prefer attorneys who are willing to 
shoulder all the risks of losing. 62 Because these situations are probably 
quite common, 63 the fee-shifting rule should allow prevailing attorneys 
in such cases to recover a reasonable rate for their work: C1mv·64 
Now suppose the plaintiff or his attorney must indemnify the pre-
vailing defendant for her legal fees. Under the pure British rule, the 
plaintiff's costs are irrelevant in determining the amount of indemnifi-
cation; however, under the modified or PCC rule, the plaintiff's own 
costs limit his obligations as the losing party. It is necessary to decide 
which cost measure should be used to limit fee indemnification in this 
case. 
Here, f3J is undetermined and thus not useful. The indemnification 
limit should thus be either C1mv or Cinr·65 The losing side "spent" only 
C;n,, so placing the indemnification limit at C1mv would require the 
60. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 5, at 792-93. 
61. Id. at 794. 
62. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
63. Cf. Crovitz, supra note 31, at A14 (most personal injury cases brought on contingency-
fee basis). 
64. The Supreme Court has ruled that the defendant's indemnification burden under a statu-
tory fee-shifting provision is not limited by the prevailing plaintiff's contingency contract - C1m, 
governs. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). 
65. This raises the peripheral question of how to assess and monitor C1m, and c1• 1• The 
parties' attorneys would presumably report their hours to the court. However, reporting legal 
hours after the judgment is issued would be impractical. If the judgment were nominal and for 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney would have a large incentive to inflate elm•• If the defendant 
prevailed and indemnification under the PCC rule were limited to C1m, or c1• 1, there would be a 
strong tendency to understate the plaintiff's legal costs. The best solution would require that 
hours be reported to the cpurt on a regular basis, such as monthly, in the period commencing 
with filing of the claim and proceeding up to the time of judgment. 
Attorneys paid on an hourly basis have a strong incentive to overstate their costs to inflate 
ultimate recovery, but under the PCC rule lower billings might limit indemnification. Incentives 
for hourly rate attorneys would probably be largely self-policing, assuming attorneys charge cli-
ents amounts that are consistent with those provided to the court. 
Conversely, contingency-fee lawyers have a strong incentive to understate costs under the 
PCC rule to limit indemnification. Again, this tendency is checked by the possibility that the 
prevailing contingecy fee attorney may recover fees calculated on the basis of reported legal costs 
if damages are nominal. The opposing attorney will also contest obviously underreported hours. 
The court, too, should question suspicious reports of very low hours. Finally, hours reported to 
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loser to indemnify the winner at a higher level than expenses. As dis-
cussed above, however, when the prevailing plaintiff recovers only 
nominal damages, the defendant should pay the plaintiff's attorney the 
fair market value of his work, C1m., rather than C;nr· Because a losing 
defendant must pay at least the higher C1m., reciprocity obliges the 
losing plaintiff to indemnify the defendant at that rate. Moreover, lim-
iting indemnification to the true internal cost felt by the plaintiff's at-
torney seems artificial, may be more open to adverse attorney 
manipulation, and in any case denies the prevailing defendant a por-
tion of the recovery that she would receive if the plaintiff had used an 
hourly attorney. Thus, plaintiff's indemnification limit under the PCC 
rule should be Cfmv. 
To summarize, the losing defendant should normally be required 
to pay the full contingency fee, {3J. When the plaintiff prevails with 
only nominal damages, the defendant should pay the plaintiff's attor-
ney Cfmv under either the British or PCC rules. When the defendant 
prevails under the British rule, she is entitled to full indemnification 
for her fees. However, under the PCC rule, her recovery should be 
limited by C1mv· The only role C;n1 plays in this Note is to assess the 
plaintiff attorney's expected economic benefits. 66 
The third and final preliminary question is whether the plaintiff's 
own perspective or that of his attorney should be adopted in assessing 
the likelihood of settlement. Part I assumed that the underlying par-
ties estimated costs and probabilities which dictated the settlement 
conditions. In a contingency fee arrangement, however, the plaintiff 
and his attorney will have markedly different conditions for settle-
ment. In fact, under most plausible circumstances, the contingency-
fee attorney will consistently benefit if he can obtain a reasonable set-
tlement from the defendant and forego the expenses of trial. 67 If a 
plaintiff retains an attorney who is able to lay aside personal considera-
tions of profit, or at least is scrupulously ethical in pursuing only his 
client's best interests, the settlement decision should be analyzed from 
the plaintiff's perspective. The legitimacy of this presumption is 
clearly a matter of conjecture. 
Adopting the plaintiff's perspective on settlement may make more 
sense under the British and PCC rules. The plaintiff may well play a 
larger role in the settlement process under an indemnification scheme, 
particularly if the plaintiff is the indemnitor and not his attorney. 
Moreover, higher stakes will logically create a greater incentive for 
confident plaintiffs to spur their attorneys on to litigation. 68 Such 
the court should be provided to the client; if the hours are suspiciously low, the client may 
confront the attorney or even seek another lawyer who will work harder. 
66. See infra equation (14). 
67. See infra equations (16) and (17) and accompanying text. 
68. See infra appendix; supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiffs will be less likely to accept a small fraction of their claims 
due to the higher rewards of winning under a fee-shifting rule. 
This Note analyzes settlement conditions under the various fee-
shifting rules using each of the alternate perspectives, the plaintiff's 
and his attorney's. Both are useful. The plaintiff's perspective reflects 
an ideal lawyer-client relationship where the lawyer devotes himself to 
furthering only the client's interests. Cynics may contend that the at-
torney's perspective more closely reflects reality, but viewing settle-
ment from the contingency-fee attorney's perspective overpredicts 
settlement when variables are replaced by realistic values. Conversely, 
comparing the settlement conditions from the plaintiff's perspective 
probably underpredicts settlement frequency in practice. 69 Examining 
the settlement conditions from both perspectives best fulfills the pur-
pose of this Note: to predict the direction and magnitude of the 
change in settlement frequency under the three fee-shifting rules. 
B. Expected Benefits and Costs Under the Three Fee-shifting Rules 
and Contingent Attorney Compensation 
The following economic analysis examines the impact of the three 
fee-shifting rules - American, British, and PCC - when the plaintiff 
pursues his claim under a contingency fee arrangement with his attor-
ney. The concepts and terms used below mirror the analysis in Part I. 
For each fee-shifting rule, the expected benefit or cost is determined 
for the plaintiff, the plaintiff's lawyer, and the defendant, denoted F, 
Fiaw• and f, respectively. The terms introduced in the preceding sec-
tion are also used: f3 (contingency fee percentage), C1mv (fair market 
value of plaintiff la,wyer's legal services), and C1nr (internal cost of 
plaintiff lawyer's legal work). This section incorporates the assump-
tions examined in section II.A above: (1) f3 is constant; (2) the suc-
cessful plaintiff's attorney normally recovers {3J;' and (3) if the plaintiff 
prevails with only nominal damages or a declaratory judgment under 
the British and PCC rules, the defendant pays plaintiff's attorney a 
reasonable rate for his work, C1mv. 
1. American Rule 
The plaintiff's expected benefit, F, under the American rule is the 
probability of victory times the plaintiff's share of the expected judg-
ment amount: 
F = (1 - /3)PJ. (13) 
The plaintiff lawyer's expected benefit, Fiaw• after deducting for inter-
nal costs of pursuing the claim is 
69. Compare settlement conditions from the plaintiff's perspective, infra note 77 with settle· 
ment conditions from his lawyer's perspective, infra note 90. 
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F1aw = /3P J - Cini • 
Defendant's expected cost, f, is simply 




Before continuing with the fee-shifting comparison, note how the 
settlement conditions differ depending on whose perspective is 
adopted, plaintiff's or his attorney's. For settlement to occur, the ex-
pected cost to the defendant must exceed the expected benefit to the 
plaintiff (or his attorney). From the plaintiff's viewpoint, this condi-
tion is expressed by 
(1 - /3)PJ 5:..pj + c 
or 
(1 - /3)PJ - pj 5:..c. 
The condition from the plaintiff attorney's perspective is 
{3PJ - Cini 5:.. pj + c 
or 
{3PJ - pj 5:.. Cini+ c. 
(16) 
(17) 
The more easily these conditions are satisfied, the more often settle-
ment will occur. Clearly the settlement condition will always be satis-
fied more easily from the lawyer's perspective. The LHS of the 
settlement condition from the lawyer's perspective (17) will always be 
less than the LHS of the settlement condition from the plaintiff's per-
spective (16) so long as f3 is less than fifty percent. More importantly, 
the RHS of the settlement condition will always be larger from the 
lawyer's perspective because the lawyer would like to avoid incurring 
the internal costs of trial, Cini· Thus, because the attorney expects to 
receive less money from a potential judgment than the plaintiff and 
because he will incur any costs of trial, the lawyer will always have 
greater personal incentive to seek settlement than his client. 
2. British Rule 
Analysis of the British rule under the contingency system is bifur-
cated, depending on whether the plaintiff or his attorney is the respon-
sible indemnifying party. When the plaintiff must indemnify under 
the British rule, he expects to receive the entire judgment amount, J, if 
successful at trial. His expected benefit is discounted, however, by the 
risk of paying the defendant's legal costs: 
F = PJ - (1 - P)c. (18) 
The plaintiff attorney's expected benefits under the British rule would 
normally be identical to the expected benefits under the American 
rule: 
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F1aw = {3PJ - Cini• 
As discussed in section II.A, however, the plaintiff may prevail at trial 
but recover only nominal damages. In that case, plaintiff's attorney 
would not receive f3J but C1mv· When this possibility is considered, the 
better representation of the attorney's expected benefits is 
F1aw = P[max(/3J,Cfmv)] - Cini· (19) 
When the plaintiff's lawyer is responsible for paying the prevailing 
defendant's attorney fees under the British Rule, the expected benefit 
equations for the plaintiff and his attorney are 
F = PJ (20) 
F1aw = P[max(/3J,Cfmv)] - (1 - P')c - C1n1 • (21) 
The defendant's expected costs are the same regardless of whether 
the plaintiff or his lawyer assumes indemnification responsibility: 
f = pLJ + max(/3j,Cfmv)] - (1 - p')c + C. (22) 
3. PCC Rule 
Finally, the PCC fee-shifting rule limits indemnification to the 
loser's own legal costs. Like the pure British rule, the analysis is bifur-
cated, depending on whether the plaintiff or his attorney indemnifies 
the winning defendant. 
Because indemnification under the PCC rule will often be limited, 
the deficit in legal fee compensation must either be borne by the pre-
vailing party or by the successful attorney. Obviously an attorney en-
gaged on an hourly basis will demand full payment regardless of the 
outcome of trial. Similarly, many plaintiff attorneys may insist on full 
contingency fee compensation, {3J, leading to less than full recovery by 
the plaintiff. Other contingency-fee attorneys, however, may be will-
ing to risk compensation limited by opposing counsel expenses; this is 
especially likely where the defendant is expected to incur substantial 
legal costs. The economic analysis requires choosing whether the suc-
cessful plaintiff or his attorney should absorb the fee deficit under lim-
ited indemnification. This section and the following section analyze 
the economic incentives under both conditions. 
PCC Version J, Attorney Compensation Limited: The plaintiff's 
lawyer will bear the risk of limited compensation when the presump-
tive rule is that the plaintiff should be kept whole, notwithstanding his 
lawyer's success at trial. The expected benefits to the plaintiff and his 
attorney when the plaintiff indemnifies are 
F = PJ - (1 - P)min(Cfmv,c) (23) 
and 
(24) 
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The expected benefits to these parties when the attorney indemnifies 
are 
F = PJ (25) 
and 
Fraw = P{min[max(JY,Cfmv),c]} - (1 - P)min(CJmv•C) - Cint. (26) 
The defendant's expected cost is again the same whoever indemnifies: 
f = p{j + min[max(pj,Cfmv),c]} - (1 - p)min(CJmv•C) + C. (27) 
PCC Version 2, Plaintiff Compensation Limited: The plaintiff's 
lawyer will be fully compensated if the plaintiff remits to the lawyer 
any shortfall in indemnification. In such a case the plaintiff is worse 
off than under a pure British rule, but better off than under the Ameri-
can rule. The expected benefits to the plaintiff and his attorney under 
such an arrangement, when the plaintiff indemnifies, are 
F = P{J - [3J + min[max(/3.T,C/mv),c] ~ - (1 - P)min(CJm.,c) (28) 
and 
Fraw = P{3J - Cint • (29) 
The expected benefits to these parties when the attorney indemnifies 
are 
F = P{J - {3J + min[max(JY,Cfmv),c]} (30) 
and 
Fraw = P{3J - (1 - P)min(Cfm.,C) - C;nr. (31) 
The defendant's costs remain the same as in equation (27). 
C. Settlement Conditions Under Contingency Fee 
In this section, the expected gains and costs developed in the pre-
ceding section are used to compare the likelihood of settlement under 
the three fee-shifting rules when the plaintiff's lawyer is paid contin-
gent on recovery. The following analysis examines the settlement con-
ditions under the three fee-shifting rules from both the plaintiff's and 
the plaintiff attorney's perspectives. The alternative parties responsi-
ble for the plaintiff's indemnification duty, lawyer or client, are also 
both examined below. This approach creates four scenarios: (1) plain-
tiff's perspective of the settlement condition with the plaintiff as in-
demnitor; (2) plaintiff's perspective with his attorney as indemnitor; 
(3) plaintiff attorney's perspective of the settlement condition with the 
plaintiff as indemnitor; and ( 4) plaintiff attorney's perspective with the 
attorney as indemnitor. 
The analytical approach of this section parallels the methodology 
employed in Part I.7° This section asserts that, regardless of whose 
70. Unfortunately, the equations in this section are substantially more complicated than 
those developed in Part I; the same main ideas, however, underlie the formulas. 
2176 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2154 
perspective is adopted or who bears responsibility for indemnification, 
a facial examination of the settlement conditions indicates more settle-
ments under the American rule. However, because costs and parties' 
assessments of success change under the three different fee-shifting 
rules, settlement when a contingency-fee attorney represents the plain-
tiff is again probably more likely under the British and PCC rules. 
Case 1: Plaintiff Perspective, Plaintiff Indemnifies 
Settlement will occur under the American rule when the plaintiff's 
expected gains, F, are less than or equal to the defendant's expected 
costs, f. Substituting from equations (13) and (15): 
(1-{3)PJ 5:..pj + c. 
Settlement under the British rule requires substitutions from (18) and 
(22): 
PJ - (1 - P)c 5:..pl/ + max(/3j,Cfmv)] - (1 - p)c + C. 
The settlement condition for the PCC rule depends on whether the 
plaintiff or his lawyer risks limited compensation. Assuming first that 
the plaintiff is kept whole and the lawyer absorbs any deficit (PCC 
version 1), the settlement condition is derived from equations (23) and 
(27): 
PJ - (1 - P)min(C1mv1C) 5:.. 
p{j + min[max(/3j,Cfmv),c]} - (1 - p)min(C1mv1C) + c. 
When the attorney is confident of full compensation (PCC version 2), 
the LHS is replaced by (28): 
P{J - f3J + min[max(/3.l,Cfmv),c]} - (1 - P)min(C1mv1C) 5:.. 
p{j + min[max(/3j,Cfmv),c]} - (1 - p)min(C1mv1C) + c. 
The above conditions may be rearranged to facilitate 
comparison:71 
0 5:.. pj - PJ + P{3J + c (32) 
0 5:.. pj - PJ + p[max(/3j,Cfmv)] (P - p)c + c (33) 
0 5:.. pj - PJ + p{min[max(/3j,Cfmv),c]} 
(P - p)min(C1mv1C) + C (34) 
0 5:.. pj - PJ + ~P{3J - (P - p){min[max(/3j,Cfmv),c]} ~ -
(P - p)min(CJmv•C) + C. (35) 
71. The last PCC equation as simplified implicitly assumes that J = j in the second term; 
this assumption is repeated in equation (39) infra for Case 2. This simplification has been im· 
plicit throughout this Note for all of the fee-shifting rules. See supra note 25. 
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The four equations represent the conditions necessary for settlement to 
occur under the rules: American (32), British (33), PCC with plaintiff 
kept whole (34), and PCC with plaintiff's lawyer kept whole (35). The 
greater the RHS, the more likely settlement will occur. 
If the parties' legal costs and assessments of success remain con-
stant under different fee-shifting rules, the first equation is clearly 
more often satisfied, implying that the American rule will result in 
more settlements than either the British or PCC rules. This is so for 
two reasons: first, because P > p, P{3J will always be greater than the 
corresponding terms below; second, the last three equations include a 
negative term absent from the American rule. 
As Part I of this Note argued, however, to assume that probabili-
ties and costs will remain constant as the fee-shifting rules change is 
unreasonable. Indemnification automatically raises the stakes of the 
controversy, and litigation costs will probably increase considerably,72 
perhaps twofold. 73 Furthermore, the gap between the parties' esti-
mates of plaintiff success (P - p) will likely contract as risk-averse 
parties become more conservative in their assessments - the plaintiff 
will tend to hedge toward the low side for P, while the cautious de-
fendant will increase her estimate of the plaintiff's chances, p. The 
first term of the equations,pj - PJ, will thus contract and become less 
negative under the British and PCC rules. This contraction in the first 
term under indemnification will often offset the reduction seen in the 
second term under indemnification. 
For example, if P and p are 0. 7 and 0.3 under the American rule 
and converge under the British rule to 0.6 and 0.4 respectively, a 0.2.l 
gain is realized in the first term under indemnification (assuming J and 
j are equal). The second term under the American rule equals 0.7{3J. 
Under the British rule, assuming a substantial judgment, the second 
term equals 0.4{3J; thus, moving from the American rule to the British 
rule reduces the second term by 0.3{3J. If f3 is one third, the second 
term is less positive by O. lJ under the British rule. This reduction is 
only half the gain realized in the first term in moving to the British 
rule; therefore, settlement would more likely result under the British 
rule given these realistic assumptions. 
Although the newly introduced third term in all three indemnifica-
tion settlement conditions is negative and detracts from the likelihood 
of settlement, increased legal costs will normally offset this term's im-
pact. The probability gap (P - p) will often be less than 0.5;74 any 
greater disparity in the parties' expectations of success would severely 
reduce the likelihood of settlement under the American rule. The con-
72. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
73. Katz, supra note 9, at 167. 
74. Cf. Hause, supra note 9, at 167 (finding it unlikely that P - p is "large" relative to 1 due 
to professional advice from lawyers). 
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vergence effect discussed above strengthens this assumption under 
conditions of indemnification. Doubling the defendant's legal costs, c, 
would thus overcome the effects of this negative term as compared to 
the American rule. 
Suppose c were $1000 under the American rule and doubled under 
the British rule to $2000, and that P - p = 0.4 under the British rule 
(33). The third term under this rule's settlement condition will equal 
negative $800. This negative number is less in absolute terms than the 
$1000 increase inc. The RHS thus undergoes a net increase, resulting 
in a greater likelihood of settlement under the British rule. The above 
analysis is even more compelling for both versions of the PCC rule. 
The third term of both PCC rule equations is less negative than (or 
equal to) the third term of the British rule; thus, these terms under the 
PCC rule would appear to promote more settlements than the corre-
sponding terms under the British rule. Moreover, if the probability 
gap is narrower, the expected increase in legal costs need not be as 
great.7s 
The settlement condition for the PCC rule contains limits on in-
demnification that attenuate the critical terms of the British-rule set-
tlement condition. Limits on indemnification, which tend to lower the 
stakes as compared to the British rule, also dampen incentives to in-
crease legal expenditures or to revise probability estimates.76 So while 
partial indemnification will tend to drive up the parties' legal costs of 
going to trial, the increase will be less than the British rule. Intui-
tively, however, it seems likely that the parties will nevertheless signifi-
cantly temper their estimates of success, as compared to the American 
rule, given the risk of partial indemnification; P - p under the PCC 
rule will probably approach the contraction level predicted under the 
British rule. This is especially true for plaintiffs, who risk nothing 
under the American rule, and nonwealthy litigants who probably pre-
fer to avoid risk. Thus, although legal costs will increase less under 
the PCC rule, one expects settlement under the rule to approach that 
of the British rule due to the likelihood of substantial probability 
convergence. 
The first PCC settlement condition (34) assumes that the plaintiff 
will be kept whole and that the successful plaintiff's attorney will ab-
sorb any shortfall in indemnification from the defendant. In such a 
case, the plaintiff may have less incentive to settle than a British-rule 
plaintiff because the PCC rule limits the plaintiff's potential indemnifi-
cation responsibilities. This is reflected in the second term of (34), 
which is less than or equal to the second term of the British-rule settle-
75. If (P - p) = 0.3, a 43% increase in legal costs would erase the effects of the negative 
third term. 
76. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
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ment condition (33); this term thus promotes less settlement than the 
British rule. 
The second PCC settlement condition (35) assumes that the suc-
cessful plaintiff will pay his attorney in full regardless of how much the 
defendant indemnifies. The second term of (35) thus contains a large 
positive cost term to the plaintiff, P[3J, less an appropriate adjustment 
for indemnification offered by the defeated defendant. Clearly, the 
second term of (35) will be much more positive than the second term 
of (34), promoting settlement far more frequently. This is because the 
plaintiff faces a risk of substantial legal costs if the case proceeds to 
trial - risk which is avoided through settlement. Indeed, this effect 
under the second version of the PCC rule will often promote higher 
settlement rates than the British rule. This is best illustrated by a nu-
merical example offered in the margin. 71 
The divergence between the two versions of the PCC rule, depen-
dent on placement of the successful attorney's indemnification deficit, 
may not be as sharp in practice as it is in theory. Regardless of where 
the risk might fall initially were the rule adopted, parties could con-
tractually adjust fee arrangements to redistribute burdens and poten-
tial awards. 78 This is another application of the Coase theorem similar 
to that proposed for the distribution of overall indemnification risk -
upon plaintiff or his attorney - under the British and PCC rules. 79 
Such reallocation promotes market efficiency. 
77. Assume the following: P = 0.7, p = 0.3, and c = $1000 under the American rule, 
changing to P = 0.6, p = 0.4 under all of the indemnification rules; c = $2000 under the British 
rule and c = $1700 under the PCC rule; Cfm• = $2000; J = j = $10,000; f3 = 33%. With these 
realistic assumptions, the RHS of each settlement condition is easily calculated. 
American: 
(3000 - 7000) + (2333) + 1000 = -667 
British: 
(4000 - 6000) + (0.4)[max(3333, 2000)] - (0.2)(2000) + 2000 = 933 
PCC #1: 
(4000 - 6000) + (0.4){min[max(3333, 2000), 1700] f - (0.2)[min(2000, 1700)] + 1700 = 40 
PCC #2: 
(4000 - 6000) + j2000 - (0.2){min[max(3333, 2000), 1700] ff - (0.2)[min(2000, 1700)] + 
1700 = 1020 
The greater the RHS, the more likely settlement will occur. These values indicate that the par-
ties would settle under any indemnification rule but not under the American rule. Settlement 
would be most likely under the second version of the PCC rule, with the plaintiff assuring his 
attorney full compensation {JJ, and under the British rule. These are followed by the first version 
of the PCC rule, where the plaintiff is kept whole, and finally the American rule. Note that if 
Cfm• were less than c under the PCC rule, the RHS of both PCC versions would be higher and 
settlement even more likely. 
This and subsequent numerical examples merely illustrate the model's behavior given plausi-
ble parameters; it is not intended as a general proof of the relative likelihood of settlement under 
Case 1 settlement conditions. Although its results are certainly manipulable according to sup-
plied inputs, the hierarchy of settlement likelihood between the various settlement equations is 
not highly sensitive to reasonable adjustments of the above inputs. 
78. The plaintiff and attorney may, for example, agree to split the difference in any shortfall 
resulting from limited indemnification. 
79. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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To summarize the comparisons under Case 1: when the plaintiff's 
attorney is retained on a contingency basis, the plaintiff will more 
often favor settlement under the British rule than the American rule 
due to a combination of risk aversion, higher anticipated litigation 
costs, and more careful assessments of success. The enhanced settle-
ment incentives will assert themselves most strongly when the parties' 
estimates of success are relatively close, i.e., when (P - p) is less than 
0.5. 
Settlement likelihood under the PCC rule is sensitive to allocation 
of underpayment responsibility. The effect of the proposed PCC rule 
is unclear under the first version of the rule, where the successful 
plaintiff bears no responsibility to his attorney for the defendant's 
under-indemnification. Although the possibility of indemnifying a 
successful defendant will generally prompt more conservative esti-
mates and greater legal costs, thus encouraging settlement, these fac-
tors may not overcome the greater tendency to litigate when limited 
fee recovery enhances the stakes. so The second version of the rule, 
where the plaintiff assures his attorney full recompense, greatly en-
courages settlement from the plaintiff's perspective and may surpass 
the British rule in promoting settlement. Under the PCC rule, it ap-
pears that settlement rates would certainly not be much reduced as 
compared to the American rule and might well be significantly 
higher.81 
Case 2: Plaintiff's Perspective, Plaintiff's Lawyer Indemnifies 
Section A of this Part argued for indemnification by the plaintiff, 
and not his contingency-fee lawyer, under the British and PCC rules. 82 
The settlement conditions when the plaintiff's lawyer indemnifies are 
examined below because many plaintiffs may contract to shift the in-
demnification burden to their contingency-fee attorneys. Further-
more, the analysis illustrates a consistent settlement pattern under the 
three fee-shifting rules. 
The settlement conditions from the plaintiff's perspective when his 
lawyer indemnifies are as follows for the American rule, British rule, 
PCC rule with the plaintiff kept whole, and PCC rule with the plain-
tiff's attorney kept whole:83 
80. Further empirical research would be very helpful in assessing potential litigant behavior; 
i.e., litigation scenarios could be constructed and posed to sufficiently large student population 
groups under the three rules to determine the different rules' impacts on P, p, c, and settlement 
rates. 
81. The plaintiff attorney's influence in reaching a settlement may play a significant role. 
The discussion in Cases 3 and 4, infra, demonstrates that his settlement incentive under either 
version of the PCC rule is probably substantially larger than under the American rule. 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48. 
83. The settlement conditions for the American rule utilize equations (13) and (15); British 
rule (20) and (22); PCC rule version 1 (25) and (27); and PCC rule version 2 (30) and (27). 
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(1 - {3)PJ ~pj + c 
PJ ~PU + max(/3j,Cfmv)] - (1 - p)c + C 
PJ ~p{j + min[max(/3j,Cfmv),c]} - (1 - p)min(Cfmv1C) + c 
P{J - {3J + min[max(/3J,Cfmv),c]} ~ 
p{j + min[max(/3j,Cfmv),c]} - (1 - p)min(Cfmv1C) + C. 
These may be rearranged for comparison as follows: 
0 ~pj-PJ + P{3J + c (36) 
0 ~ pj- PJ + p[max(/3j,Cfmv)] (1 - p)c + c (31) 
0 ~ pj - PJ + p{min[max(/3j,Cfmv),c]} 
(1 - p)min(Cfmv1C) + C (38) 
0 ~ pj - PJ + {Pf3J - (P - p){min[max(/3j,Cfmv),c]} }-
(1 - p)min(Cfmv1C) + C. (39) 
The equation for the American rule is identical to the case where 
the plaintiff indemnifies. The RHS of the equations for the British and 
PCC rules, however, are smaller than the corresponding equations 
when the plaintiff is the indemnitor. Comparing the above equations 
with (33), (34), and (35), the term (P - p) has increased to (1 - p ), 
making these terms more negative and settlement less likely. The rela-
tive decrease in settlement likelihood occurs simply because the plain-
tiff faces no risk of proceeding to trial and therefore has far less 
incentive to settle. 
The RHS under the British and PCC rules will nonetheless often 
be larger than the RHS under the American rule. An example using 
realistic parameters is provided in the margin. 84 The probabilities P 
84. Assume the same parameters given in the example in Case 1, supra note 77, except as-
sume that the plaintiff's estimate of his success, P. remains 0. 7 under all rules. The plaintiff in 
Case 2 has no indemnification responsibility under the British or PCC rules and will therefore 
have no incentive to adjust P downward. The RHS of each settlement condition under Case 2 is 
calculated as follows: 
American: 
(3000 - 7000) + (2333) + 1000 = -667 
British: 
(4000 - 7000) + (0.4)[max(3333, 2000)] - (0.6)(2000) + 2000 = -867 
PCC #1: 
(4000 - 7000) + (0.4)lmin[max(3333, 2000), 1700] f - (0.6)[min(2000, 1700)] + 1700 = 
-1640 
PCC #2: 
(4000 - 7000) + j2000 - (0.3)jmin[max(3333, 2000), 1700] f - (0.6)[min(2000, 1700)] + 
1700 = -830 
The higher the RHS, the more likely settlement will occur, with cases settling if greater than 
zero. If the parties confronted these estimates, settlement would be least likely under the PCC 
rule version 1 where the plaintiff is kept whole. The plaintiff under that rule risks nothing and 
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and p will still tend to converge under any indemnification scheme due 
mainly to risk-averse defendants increasing their assessments of p. 
The defendant's stakes in the litigation also remain larger under the 
British and PCC rules than under the American rule; changes in in-
demnification responsibility will not normally affect the rationale un-
derlying an increase in defense expenditures, c.85 Finally, as noted 
below in Case 4, lawyer indemnification substantially alters settlement 
incentives as viewed by a self-interested lawyer. 
Case 3: Lawyer's Perspective, Plaintiff Indemnifies 
An inspection of the lawyer's incentives under the fee-shifting rules 
yields helpful insights into the dynamics of the settlement process. 
For pedagogical purposes, the following analysis assumes that the law-
yer has forsaken agency obligations and seeks to maximize personal 
gain. 
For settlement to occur, the plaintiff attorney's expected gains, 
F1awo must be less than or equal to the defendant's expected costs, f. 
When the plaintiff indemnifies, the lawyer views the settlement condi-
tions under the American, British, and versions one and two of the 
PCC rules as follows:B6 
P{3J - Cini ~pj + c 
P[max(f3J,C1mv)] - Cini ~PU + max(f3j,C1mv)] - (1 - p)c + c 
P{min[max(f3J,Cfmv),c]} - Cini~ 
p{j + min[max(f3j,Cfmv), c]} - (1 - p)min(C1m.,c) + c 
P{3J - Cini~ 
p{j + min[max(f3j,C/mv),c]} - (1 - p)min(C1m.,c) + c. 
receives full undiluted judgment if successful, and the defendant's expected costs are reduced by 
a probability of indemnification. The outcomes under the other three rules are all roughly equal 
and would readily shift position with modest adjustments of the variables. 
85. The plaintiff's attorney may be more likely than the plaintiff to pay indemnification obli· 
gations to the winning defendant due to creditworthiness and concerns for professional reputa-
tion. If defendants perceive this to be true, the stakes will be correspondingly higher when the 
attorney indemnifies than when the plaintiff indemnifies, leading to higher expected legal expend· 
itures and enhanced probability of settlement. 
86. The settlement conditions for the American rule utilize equations (14) and (15); British 
rule (19) and (22); PCC rule version 1 (24) and (27); and PCC rule version 2 (29) and (27). 
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In order to simplify the expressions and facilitate comparison, assume 
explicitly that the parties' estimates of expected trial judgment, J andj, 
are equal under all rules. 87 Rearranging the above equations: 
0 5:. pJ P{3J + C;nr + c (40) 
0 5:. pJ (P - p )max(/3J, Cfmv) - (1-p)c + C;nr + c (41) 
0 5:. pJ (P - p)min[max(/3.T,Cfmv),c] 
(1 - p)min(Cfm.,c) + C;nr + c (42) 
0 5:. pJ - {Pf3J - p{min[max(/3.T,Cfmv),c] ~ ~ 
(1 - p)min(Cfm.,c) + C;nr + c. (43) 
Again, settlement is more likely to occur when the RHS is large. 
Varying the fee-shifting rules from the contingency-fee lawyer's 
perspective has several significant effects on settlement likelihood. 
First, indemnification introduces a relatively large negative term (1 -
p) into the RHS of the last three settlement conditions, making settle-
ment less likely. The impact of this term is blunted, however, by the 
second term under the British and PCC settlement equations; the sec-
ond term will nearly always be far less negative and more conducive to 
settlement than the second term under the American rule. Second, as 
explored previously in other indemnification contexts, the heightened 
stakes will tend to increase p. 88 If p is large enough to prompt settle-
ment under the American rule in the first equation, p's inflated value 
under indemnification will strongly affect the first three RHS terms 
under the British and PCC rules, making the RHS more positive and 
increasing the likelihood of settlement. Finally, large increases pre-
dicted in both the defendant's external legal costs, c, and the contin-
gent attorney's own internal costs, C;n1, 89 will commonly overcome the 
negativity of the third terms under indemnification rules - the impact 
of (1 - p )c under the British rule and the corresponding terms below 
under the PCC rule will be small compared to the relative increase in c 
and C;nr· 
The sum of the above effects strongly suggests that attorneys 
would be more likely to advocate settlement under either rule of plain-
87. See supra note 25. 
88. The plaintiff attorney's estimate of the probability of success, P, will probably not change 
much from the American rule because the attorney does not bear the risk of indemnification. Cf. 
supra note 84 (discussing similar stability for plaintiff's probability estimate in Case 2). 
89. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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tiff indemnification. A numerical example is again set in the margin.90 
As discussed previously, limited indemnification under the PCC rule 
would result in less dramatic increases in legal costs and perhaps 
somewhat more modest revisions of the defendant's probability esti-
mate p. Because the PCC rule is essentially an intermediate position 
between the American and British rules, the PCC rule would also tend 
to result in more settlements than the American rule. The settlement 
incentives encountered by a contingency-fee attorney litigating under 
the two indemnification rules differ only in degree. 
Case 4: Lawyer's Perspective, Lawyer Indemnifies 
The final inquiry is whether settlement is more or less likely from 
the plaintiff lawyer's perspective when that lawyer is responsible for 
indemnification. The settlement conditions are91 
{3PJ - C;nr .:5.pj + c 
P[max(f3J,Cfmv)] - (1 - P)c - C;nr .:5. 
PU + max(f3j,Cfmv)] - (1 - p)c + c 
P~min[max(f3J,Cfmv),c]} - (1 - P)min(C1mv1C) - Cint .:5. 
PV + min[max(f3j,Cfmv),c]} - (1 - p)min(C1mv1C) + C 
P{3J - (1 - P)min(C1mv,c) - C;nr .:5. 
PV + min[max(f3j,Cfmv),c]} - (1 - p)min(C1mv1C) + C. 
90. Because the plaintiff attorney's estimate of P will probably not change from the Ameri· 
can rule upon shifting to an indemnification scheme, supra note 88, assume the same parameter 
values as in Case 2, supra note 84. Assume also that C1.,= $1000 under the American rule and 
C1.,= $1500 under indemnification. The RHS of each settlement condition is again easily 
calculated. 
American: 
3000 - 2333 + 1000 + 1000 = 2667 
British: 
4000 - (0.3)[max(3333, 2000)] - (0.6)2000 + 1500 + 2000 = 5300 
PCC #1: 
4000 - (0.3)jmin[max(3333, 2000), 1700] f - (0.6)[min(2000, 1700)] + 1500 + 1700 = 
5670 
PCC #2: 
4000 - ~(0.7)(3333) - (0.4)jmin[max(3333, 2000), 1700] ~ - (0.6)[min(2000, 1700)] + 
1500 + 1700 = 4527 
Because the RHS of each equation is far greater than zero, the plaintiff attorney will always 
prefer settlement to trial under any fee-shifting rule under these assumptions. The likelihood for 
settlement is greatest under the British rule and version 1 of the PCC rule. It is smallest under 
the American rule, mainly because the defendant faces no prospective indemnification costs in 
the event of her defeat. Note that the risk oflimited compensation borne by the plaintiff attorney 
under version 1 of the PCC rule leads to higher RHS values and a somewhat greater likelihood of 
settlement than when he is guaranteed his full contingency fee under version 2. 
91. The benefit and cost equations for the American rule, British rule, and versions 1 and 2 of 
the PCC rules are taken from equations (14) and (15), (21) and (22), (26) and (27), and (31) and 
(27) respectively. 
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Rearranging ~nd letting J j as in Case 3:92 
0 5:._pJ P{3J + C;nr + c (44) 
0 5:._pJ (P - p)[max(/3.T,Cfmv)] (P-p)c + C;nr + c (45) 
0 5:._pJ (P - p)min[max(/3.T,Cfmv),c] -
(P - p )min( C1m., c) + C;nr + c (46) 
0 5:._pJ - {Pf3J - p{min[max(/3.l,Cfmv),c] ~ ~ 
(P - p)min(C1m.,c) + C;nr + c. (47) 
These settlement equations are nearly identical to the settlement 
conditions examined from the lawyer's perspective when the plaintiff 
indemnified in Case 3. The only change is the third term under the 
British and PCC rules, which is now less negative because (P - p) is 
less than (1 - p). From the lawyer's perspective, the RHS of the 
settlement conditions under indemnification rules will increase, and 
settlement will become more frequent than when the plaintiff indemni-
fies. A final numerical example may be found in the margin.93 Case 3 
concluded that settlement was more likely from the lawyer's perspec-
tive under plaintiff indemnification than under the American rule. 
The arguments supporting that conclusion are even more persuasive in 
the instant case: the indemnifying lawyer is understandably more in-
clined to seek settlement when his expected gains of going to trial have 
diminished so markedly. Thus, although full or partial indemnifica-
tion by the lawyer may conceivably slightly reduce the plaintiff's set-
tlement incentive from that which exists under the American rule,94 
the lawyer's enhanced desire to settle will almost certainly play a ma-
jor role in the decision to litigate. 
92. See supra equations (40) through (43) and accompanying text. 
93. Both the plaintiff attorney and the defendant will adjust their estimates of plaintiff suc-
cess with a move to indemnification. Thus, assume the same parameter values as in Case 1, supra 
note 77. Assume as in Case 3, supra note 90, that c,.,= $1000 under the American rule and that 
C1.,= $1500 under indemnification. The RHS of each settlement condition calculates as follows: 
American: 
3000 - 2333 + 1000 + 1000 = 2667 
British: 
4000 - (0.2)[max(3333, 2000)] - (0.2)2000 + 1500 + 2000 = 6433 
PCC #1: 
4000 - (0.2){min[max(3333, 2000), 1700] f - (0.2)[min(2000, 1700)] + 1500 + 1700 = 
6520 
PCC:f/:2: 
4000 - { 2000 - (0.4){min[max(3333, 2000), 1700]f ~ - (0.2)[min(2000, 1700)] + 1500 + 
1700 = 5540 
The hierarchy of settlement likelihood conforms with Case 3, where the plaintiff indemnified, 
but the RHS values are significantly higher than Case 3, indicating even greater likelihood of 
settlement. The plaintiff attorney will usually strongly prefer to avoid trial and the attendant risk 
of indemnifying a victorious defendant under this final case. 
94. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81. 
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CONCLUSION 
The most recent contributions to the large body of literature exam-
ining the economic impact of claims brought under the American and 
British fee-shifting rules indicate strongly that tried cases would tend 
to be more expensive under the British rule. These higher costs will 
usually foster settlement despite the inhibitory impact of legal costs 
"discounted" due to the probability of fee recovery if successful. Lim-
ited fee indemnification, as proposed by the President's Council on 
Competitiveness, would mitigate inflated legal costs and their effects 
on settlement rates. Moreover, this intermediate position moderates 
the possible harsh effects of a pure loser-pays scheme by limiting the 
stakes involved, especially the penalty oflosing to a defendant who has 
spent heavily. 
The most important issue raised when examining settlement under 
the British and PCC rules is whether the plaintiff or his contingency-
fee attorney should bear the indemnification burden. Philosophical 
considerations of agency and plaintiff responsibility suggest the plain-
tiff should bear the risk. More importantly, placing the burden on the 
attorney exacerbates divergent lawyer/client settlement interests 
which are now apparent under the current American rule. 
The settlement effects of fee shifting in a contingency context gen-
erally coincide with the indemnification effects observed under hourly 
fee circumstances. Bearing the risk of indemnification will lead the 
plaintiff to prefer settlement. Where the attorney is responsible for 
indemnification, the plaintiff has far less incentive to settle than does 
the attorney; however, the attorney may play a large role in the plain-
tiff's settlement decision, and thus settlement rates may actually in-
crease when he indemnifies and places his interests ahead of his 
client's. In all of the cases considered, the British rule and the second 
version of the PCC rule, where the plaintiff guarantees his attorney 
full compensation if successful, should promote the most settlement. 
The American rule is least conducive to settlement, while the first ver-
sion of the PCC rule, where the plaintiff is kept whole, occupies an 
intermediate position. 
By limiting the stakes of proceeding to trial, the PCC rule seems to 
represent a sound intermediate position between the British and 
American rules. The possibility of limited indemnification will deter 
nonmeritorious claims and protect both plaintiffs and defendants from 
unlimited indemnification liability. A risk-averse plaintiff may con-
tinue to utilize the contingency fee system and may even contract to 
place indemnification responsibility on his attorney. Other issues that 
may arise under the PCC rule, such as whether the successful plain-
tiff's attorney receives his full contingency fee or only the amount pro-
vided by the defendant, are probably best determined by the legal 
marketplace through contract negotiations rather than through legis-
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lation or common law. The PCC rule, especially in its limited applica-
tion to suits filed under federal diversity jurisdiction, seems a fair 
compromise toward procedural reform. 
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APPENDIX 
Formal Derivation of Relationship Between Fee-Shifting Rule and 
Litigation Expenditures 
Indemnity raises the stakes of the claim by making winning more 
lucrative and losing more costly. As the stakes rise, both parties will 
spend more to influence the outcome. Rational litigants will spend 
money on litigation until their marginal benefits equal their marginal 
costs.95 The mathematical condition which describes this condition is 
Assume the following: 
aP 
ac >O, 
aF - 0 and Qi. - 0 ac - ac - . 
a2p 
ac2<0, 
ap a2p ac <0, and ac2 >0. 
Assume also that J and j, the parties' estimates of judgment magni-
tude, are unaffected by legal expenditures.96 These mathematical con-
ditions describe the following assumptions: As the plaintiff spends 
more money on legal costs, C, he strengthens his estimate of his suc-
cess, P.97 However, each dollar spent on legal fees decreases in effec-
tiveness over the range considered.98 Similarly, as the defendant 
increases her legal expenditures, she will increase her own odds and 
reduce her assessment of plaintiff success,p, accordingly. Her expend-
itures will likewise have diminishing marginal returns. 
With these assumptions, the equations describing expected bene-
fits, F, and expected costs,/, can be partially differentiated with respect 
to C and c respectively and set equal to zero for the American and 
British rules99 to find the point where the marginal benefit of a dollar 
95. The economic term for the point at which the parties independently equalize their margi-
nal benefits and marginal costs is a "Nash equilibrium." 
96. See supra note 26. Partial differentiation is used instead of total differentiation; thus, the 
following model implicitly ignores any effect of changes in C on c and vice versa. This assump· 
tion is made for ease of exposition. Hersch has demonstrated that codependence of C and c may 
reduce the magnitude of predicted legal cost increases under the British rule somewhat, but the 
assumption does not change the conclusion. Hersch, supra note 26, at 240 & n.11. 
97. Recall that C and c are the legal costs of going to trial. The conditions will not apply to 
initial research costs, filing of the claim, etc. The cost range relevant to the analysis begins after 
the decision to proceed to trial has been made. 
While the conditions as stated are generally true over the relevant range, undoubtedly cir· 
cumstances arise where increasing legal expenditures, e.g., through intensive discovery, will 
lower estimates of success and presumably increase inducement to settle. The analysis ignores 
this situation because such adverse discoveries will normally occur relatively early regardless of 
the fee-shifting rule; this analysis concerns expenditures at the margin. 
98. This is the familiar law of diminishing marginal returns. As dollars are spent on legal 
resources, while other inputs are held constant, the resulting incremental gains will decrease 
beyond some point. EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACQUELENE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC 
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 175-80 (2d ed. 1986). 
99. The modified PCC rule is not continuous over C and c and so can not be readily 
differentiated. 
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spent on legal expenses equals the marginal cost. Differentiating the 
equations for the American rule: 
F=PJ- C 
aF aP aP 1 ac = acJ - 1 = o, thus ac = J 
J= pj + c 
:l I' an . an -1 
:':!L = = J + 1 = 0 thus = = -.-ac ac ' ac J 
and the British rule: 
F = P(J + C) - (1 - P)c - C 
or 
F = P[J + (C + c)] - (C + c) 
g~ = g~[J + (C + c)] + P - 1 = 0 
thus 
aP 1 -P 
ac = J + (C + c) 
f =PU+ C) - (1 - p)c+ c 
or 
f = p U + (C + c)] 
Ef = .Pp_ U + (C + c)] + p = 0 
ac ac thus 
.Pp_ - -p 
ac - j + (C + c) 
The important comparison is between the values of aP;ac and 
ap;ac under the British rule and under the American rule. Recall 
these expressions represent the values of the plaintiff's and defendant's 
last legal dollars spent on influencing the probability of the plaintiff's 
success. The numerators are smaller under the British rule and the 
denominators larger; thus, fees spent at the margin under the British 
rule accomplish less than fees spent at the margin under the American 
rule. Because the model assumes that P increases with C and p de-
creases with c at decreasing rates, the lower marginal utilities mean 
that the parties' expenditures of going to trial (C and c) will be larger 
under the British rule. 
The stakes under the PCC rule lie somewhere between the stakes 
under the American and British rules. Marginal expenditures aF;ac 
and a11 ac will also be intermediate, implying lower trial costs under 
the PCC rule than the British rule but higher costs than under the 
American rule. 
